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PEER ZUMBANSEN*

Law After the Welfare State: Formalism,
Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of
Reflexive Law**
This paper analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and
neo-functionalist approaches to law-making at a time when the state is
seeking to reassert, reformulate and reconceptualize its regulatory
competence, both domestically and transnationally. While the earlier turn to
alternative regulation modes, conceptualized under the heading of "legal
pluralism,' '"responsive law,'' or "refiexive law" in the 1970s and 1980s, had
aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning
mode of legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist
jurisprudence and its reliance on "social norms" embraces a limitation
model of legal regulation. After revisiting the Legal Realist critique of
Formalism and the formulation of functionalist regulation as a progressive
agenda, this paper compares the American and German experiences with
the rise of the social interventionist state in order to ask where law stand s
"after the welfare state" at the outset of the twenty-first century.

I.

THE DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY

For some time now, scholars in law, the social sciences and
economics have been debating the future of legal regulation in an
increasingly denationalized world. The reasons for this inquiry emerge
from a wide variety of places and backgrounds, and every discipline has
been carving its own particular lens through which it perceives, traces
and assesses the specific trajectories of institutional and conceptual
change. A hallmark of these efforts is the growing interpenetration of
disciplinary discourses, with "globalization studies" having emerged as
either the crystallization or final diffusion point-whichever perspective
one may wish

to take. In the interim, writings

and courses in

"globalization and . . . ." studies have become a more or less satisfactory
label for these border-crossing inquiries into the driving forces of global
regulatory changes, national path-dependencies and newly emerging normcreating actors. Despite their political divisions, these studies, which have
produced numerous guides to these phenomena from within very vibrant
scholarly discourses, 1 suggest that there is no way back to a world before
globalization.2
One way, then, of identifying the consequences of globalization has
been to celebrate the "liberation" of commercial actors from government
intervention by making effective use of jurisdictional forumshopping, tax
havens

and radically decentralized business

organization structures.

Another one, arguably on the other end of the choicecontinuum, would
seek to radicalize globalization's de-hierarchization trends3 in search of
realizing and nurturing civic and other bottom-up emancipatory powers,
however uncomfortably and inevitably they remain situated between
assertions of the global and the local.4
Rejecting findings of unstoppable convergence across distinct
political economies, globalization scholars point to the ever-recurring,
well-known, nation-state-based distinctions and argumentative patterns:
where proponents of globalization elevate the necessary containment of
government regulation of market affairs as the defining feature of a
globalized world, critics deconstruct such claims as "ideology."5
The question remains, where to go from there? Karl Polanyi's
concern with the "double movement" constituted by the emancipation of

individual autonomy and the pursuit of public welfare, which he
identified as the greatest challenge posed by the self-regulating market at
the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries,6 is still on the agenda-or
is it?
An answer

to this question is anything but obvious. The

fundamental institutional reference points of political and legal regulation
throughout the West in the twentieth century have become thoroughly
unanchored, and as we see a conceptual shift from "government to
governance" in contemporary sociological and political analysis, 7 law-in
this scenario-appears to have become a fragile project. After its rise
through the Rule of Law, the Social Interventionist State and the Welfare
State, its contemporary fate seems to be both sealed and indeterminate.
Sealed with respect to the state's fading regulatory impact on bordercrossing

societal entities and activities,

emancipated

themselves

from

which

jurisdictional

have

powerfully

boundaries

and

confinements. Indeterminate, in turn, in at least two ways: the state
might be reasserting itself either as unitary actor or through regulatory
cooperation and concerted efforts against global threats

such as

environmental destruction or terrorism. Then, again, it might not.8 The
second avenue towards indeterminacy is paved with strong doubts as to
the state's capacity to remain an influential institution in channeling and
shaping political governance domestically. As the state becomes one of
several actors in a dramatically de-hierarchized knowledge society, the
state's proprium-political government, market regulation, administration,

responsibility

for

social

infrastructure,

guarantor

of

institutional

arrangements (education, health, safety) that during the Welfare State's era
were created to complement a constantly expanding body of individual
rights 9-seems to have come undone. Alternatives to state-originating,
"public" governance models abound, and proposals of "post-regulatory,"
"new," and "experimental" governance are offered both in competition to
separation-of-powers and hierarchy-defined models

10

and in descriptive

fashion to depict, more adequately, the complex structures of today's
intersection of politics and economics. 11
Much of the current mapping work of the knowledge society that is
being done in the social sciences 12 and law 13 unfolds in parallel with
incredibly fruitful economics research, predominantly within "New
Institutional Economics"-both inside 14 and outside 15 of its dis-

ciplinary confines. As these interdisciplinary findings are beginning to
be translated back towards a more challenging reassessment of respective
doctrinal and conceptual starting points, 16 the erosion of distinctions such
as publidprivate, economics/politics or state/market is mirrored by a
renewed, radical push for applied, objective sciences. Perhaps because
said distinctions become regarded as representative idiosyncrasies of a
century bogged down in the struggle over competing political economy
utopias, some of today's analytical assessments and policy prescriptions
read strangely simple and straightforward. 17 Yet, as is well known, the
devil is in the details, and these details lie in the ever-more complex

structure of today's invaryingly interdependent societies. As we seek to
rescue the larger questions around societal

organization from the

twentieth into the twenty-first century against the background of
concepts, instruments and tools that are dramatically losing their
explanatory power, the consequences for disciplines such as law,
economics, sociology or political science have for some time now

18

started to unfold, 19 both in research and teaching.20
This paper raises the question of the fate of law in the arrangements
of twenty-first century post-regulatory regimes. It does so with the single
mandate of contrasting the manifold implications and involvements of
law in societal organization during the last century with its precarious and
endangered place in today's domestic and transnational settings. Choosing
formalism and functionalism as the central methodological tenets in
present-day contentions of law's place in the regulation of societal
affairs, this paper seeks to illuminate the background and prospects of
this development

by revisiting the

functionalist

critique

of legal

formalism at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century onward
until the demise of normative functionalism in the retreating welfare-state
of the late twentieth century (II). The next section compares the critique
of welfare state "juridification" by both conservatives and progressives as
it emerged in Western European legal thought in the 1970s and 1980s
with the emergence of legal pluralism and "extra-legal activism" in the
United States at that time, tracing the rise of responsive and reflexive
law (III) before

addressing the current return

of formalism

and

functionalism in the area of contract law (IV). Section V concludes.

II.
A

LAW'S PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE POST-REGULATORY STATE

Formalism and Functionalism as Methodological Ground Rules
Throughout the last century, the modes of legal regulation were

continuously contested, challenged and differentiated as the arms of the
state began to reach ever deeper into the spheres of societal activity. In
contrast, the current formalist legal discourse suggests a deep skepticism
towards

the

concept

of

"order

through

law"

altogether. This

renaissance of legal formalism occurs at a time of profound changes
in societal governance. It is this context of social change that gives the
current legal theory assessments such crucial weight and impact. As
the shift "from government to governance" points to an irreversible
transformation from hierarchically organized political regulation to a
hierarchy of conflicting and competing regulatory models, the fate of
law itself, previously deeply implicated in the formulation of political
governance, is becoming highly precarious. What is problematic in the
neo-formalist focus on the 'here and now' is the loss of historical
reference points, by which contemporary contentions could be reembedded or contrasted with preceding experiences in legal regulation.
As today's turn to private ordering arguably occurs in response to the
dramatic

challenges

for

legal

regulation

domestically

and

transnationally, its present triumph comes at the price of making
invisible, the deeply dialectic nature of law in its eternal coexistence

with alternative forms of social regulation that have marked law
during the twentieth century.
Today's neo-formalist attack on legal regulation is complemented by a
neo-functionalist

prioritization

of

private

ordering

over

"state

intervention." Neo-functionalism defines the role of law and the state
through the single mandate of facilitating individual autonomy.
Whereas much of the twentieth century was characterized by the central
role of the state and by the creation of policy-driven legal norms and
judicial opinions that fueled an ambitious program of social engineering

through law , present contentions of functionalism emphasize the values
of market freedom and competition as endangered by state intervention.
With unacknowledged irony, this substitution of a functionalist
protection of the interests of society through law with a large-scale
retreat of the state in the name of individual freedom and the "demands
of the market" employs the very theoretical tools that progressive lawyers
in the United States and in Europe promoted during the 1970s and 1980s
as responses to the regulatory crisis of the welfare state. Those
progressive scholars had turned to alternative modes of legal regulation
seeking to translate law's generality into contextual, learning forms of
socio-legal regulation. Their hope had been thereby to save the political
ambitions of the welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate
over the substance and direction of political intervention. In contrast,
today's neo-formalism and neo-functionalism threatens to cut the ties
between current quest to answer the challenges of globalization and the

previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents characterize legal
regulation as inappropriately policy-driven and as undue infringement of
the societal actors' capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously.
Contract law provides one example. If today's neo-formalists criticize
contract law as paternalistic, cost-producing and competition stifling, they
posit that contractual bargains would, if left alone, be more efficient and
productive. 21 This assessment is a-historical in that it bears no connection
with decades of negotiation over the optimal degree of protection afforded
to the interests of contracting parties in a fast-evolving mass-consumer
society. The cloud of neoformalist contentions that judges are allegedly
incompetent in their dealings with complex contractual arrangements
makes this multidimensional, complex nature of contractual
disappear.

22

governance

23

Touching here24 on one of these fields-contract law-the paper
analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neofunctionalist approaches to law-making in light of the proliferation of
indirect forms of regulation. The core tenet of the paper is that while
the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, whether conceptualized
under the heading of "legal pluralism,"25 "responsive law,"26 or
"reflexive law"27 in the 1970s and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially
responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of legal
intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence
embraces a limitation model of legal regulation, the rationale of
which

is

captured

by

references to

"efficiency"

and

"market

demands." By treating market demands and private interests as selfexplanatory givens and by shifting the burden for "intervention" into
market activities to policy-makers and judges, the current turn to private
ordering effectively takes politics out of the equation.28 With that, the
neo-formalist and neo-functionalist critique of the welfare state's
ambitious programs of legal regulation ignores the degree to which the
welfare state itself always represented only one of many different
possible institutional evolutionary steps in market regulation and in an
ongoing societal debate over the best form of governing society.29 To be
sure, by not integrating the emergence, justification and contestation of
the welfare state into the present promotion of individual rights against
governmental paternalism, neo-formalists and neo-functionalists isolate
their assertions about market-ordering from a wider political debate in
which institutions such as the rule of law, the social or welfare state,
private autonomy, property rights and democracy should rightly be
seen not as means by themselves, but as mere institutional milestones
and labels in a continuing normative evolution of social ordering.30

B. Formalism and Functionalism: Then and Now

The battle between law and politics is nothing new; it marks the legal
debates throughout the twentieth century. In continental Europe,
mainly Germany and France, this narrative sequences a development of
the relation between law and the state from the Rule of

Law 31 through an Interuentionist ,32 Social state 33 through to the welfare

state 34 before depicting a growing tension between transformations of the
state into an Enabling, or Moderating state 35 on the one
hand, and new concepts of society (Risk,36 Knowledge,

37

Information,38

Network Society 39) on the other. In England, the debate was
predominantly focused on preserving a formal core of law40 against its
moralization or politicization.

41

By contrast, in the United States, the

narrative still traces the content, validity

and promises of the

"Realist"42 (later the "Social") challenge to nineteenth century "classical
legal thought"43 that eventually led to a fierce struggle over "rights"44 and
to the frustrated reaction in the form of extra-legal activism.45 Next
occurs the powerful rise of law and economics 46 and the contestation by
legal pluralism and critical legal studies,47 later opening up into a babel of
voices of multiple, competing and conflicting societal interests.48 The
battle over law and politics gains its concrete contours within a specific
socio-economic, cultural, and political context.49 The relevance of
comparing different contexts has recently been noted by scholars, who
have taken it upon themselves to depict larger trends and trajectories in
the development of legal thought, writing from both a historical and
comparative perspective. 50 The importance of such barometric and
comparative assessments lies in their tentative and explorative nature.
Given the tremendous unruliness of doctrinal categories and of social
science models and categories with which we have been trying to identify
the core of law in an age of governance, 51 it is of great merit to push for a

historical, comparative and interdisciplinary research program, precisely
because we are at an important moment for the reassessment of the
role of law.
Neo-formalism and neo-functionalism as the angles from which to
assess the current regulatory landscape shed a brighter light on the role of
law within the continuing politics of privatization. By focusing on neoformalism and neo-functionalism, one gains a clearer view of how
arguments of "necessity," of "objectivity'' and "naturalness" prepare the
ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of legal norms in
contexts that are clearly characterized by fundamental shifts from public to
private regulation.52 The presently renewed attack on contract adjudication
and governmental "intervention" wrongly depicts a market existing
without a government at the very outset.53 This depiction of the market
and the state as separate worlds enters into a troubling alliance with
policy recommendations, which promote the privatization of public
services and are often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost
reduction.54 Whether or not, and in which forms, private actors assume
formerly public regulatory functions, is not simply a sociological issue. It
represents the outcome of political choices and of other socio-economic
developments, unfolding at both the national and transnational level.55 The
allegedly available "fresh start" for societal self-regulation without state
interference stands in stark contrast to the observation already made
decades ago that when market actors are enabled and empowered to
exercise their private autonomy they are exercising this freedom based on

a public choice.56
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts
the sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party to be
exercised over the other party. [. . .] The law of contract may be
viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according to
which the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the
parties to a more or less voluntary transaction. 57

AB contractual governance has come, since the 1970s and 1980s, to
form an ever-more important part of large-scale privatization and
delegation politics,58 policies of privatizing formerly public services and
competences by delegating power to lower levels are often implemented
without a comprehensive normative assessment of the merits and goals of
such delegation.59 But, the empowerment of market actors often results
from

a

complex

individualism,

60

combination

of historically

decentralized government

61

evolved patterns of

and regulatory competition. 62

The promise of private autonomy and individual freedom, which is being
carved out within this context can only be understood against the
background

of

this historically

grown and continuously

evolving

polycontextural architecture.63 Inother words, private autonomy neither
arises from nor exists in a normative or structural vacuum.

1. Promises of Formalist Law

Ever since Max Weber described legal evolution as occurring on a

trajectory from religious (charismatic) through traditional to rational, formal
authority,64 legal scholars have been conceptualizing new challenges to
legal regulation against this evolutionary background. 65 It is particularly the
historical, socio-economic context of Weber's writing that proves so
important for today's assessment of his contribution. Weber's discussion of
formal law occurred precisely at a time when law's allegedly formal
qualities had come under close scrutiny from an arising political legal
theory that targeted the role of judges in "applying the law"66 by resorting
to a heaven of pure legal concepts.67 Weber's analysis of formal law was
complemented by keen observations of the institutional changes that
characterized the new relations between state and market, changes that in
their complexity had become the focus of emerging sociological thought
and conceptualization

68

and which soon prompted more explorations of

turn-of-the-century's industrialization and the emerging hegemony of the
market.69
Formal, in contrast to substantive rationality, would claim that the

° Formalism, en-

law is "inherently certain and predictable." 7

shrined for example in the proposition of the "rule of law," could be
directed against arbitrary power.71 Taken as such, it would mean to
resist a "social agenda"72 and "judicial activism"73 in the name of the
letter of the law.74 Formalism would come to stand at the center of the
magical, yet fragile, construction of a "rule of law," presupposing the
law's capacity to negotiate and thereby to translate, according to defined

procedural

rules,

the

different

contestations

and

political

manifestations of diverging interests in society into a reliable and
predictable catalogue of "state action."75 Yet, as the functions of
government continued to expand, such translatory practice

76

would

always carry with it the danger that law would lose its center, its
foothold and autonomy.77 As formalism claimed that the law could be
understood from within, primarily by extrapolating a logical structure
of a confined set of norms from a small set of higher-order 78 principles, the
need to recognize one or the other substantive bases for the edifice of
formal law became just too apparent. Lawyers, writing at a time of
extreme socio-economic and legal crisis, saw clearly that the association
of a system of law with a particular system of political government
posed dramatic challenges for any understanding of law in and of itself.79
Elaborations of the functions of the state in the context of a rapidly
rising industrial society, accompanied
political

contestation,

exposed

legal

by societal hardship
formalism

to

and

a sweeping

challenge in the name of different values and interests. The more the
state and its emanations through legislative, administrative and judicial
acts would change, the more this would have a fundamental impact on
law itself.BO With formal law turning functional, the covers of formalism's
foundations were irrevocably drawn away.81

2. Aspirations of Functionalism

"Therefore the idea of the social man is the only possible starting

point of juridical doctrine. "82
Functionalism could be merely the (younger) sibling of formalism,
its necessary complementary and correcting feature. Formalist law would
have to be functional in order to survive challenges arising from societal
differentiation, political contestation, secularization and economic growth.
As such, functionalism may also be understood as an outright challenge to
the formalist claim to self-restriction. Functionalism would then be a fitting
formula for law's ability to survive, mainly by remaining adaptable and
responsive.

Functionalism in law describes the way in which the

flexibilization
increasingly

and modernization of formal law, in reaction to an
complex social environment,

made

up

of

competing

interests, claims and contestations, takes place if law is to retain a
steering function in the trials of society. Functionalism, thus understood,
therefore

designates

the

degree to

which

the

law

answers

to

requirements, customs, and necessities emerging from social practice or
crystallizing out of public policy deliberations. The important feature here
is that a functionalist approach in any legal area, from administrative to
contract to corporate law, is based on the premise that regulation is in fact
possible. What functionalism itself does not answer is who the author of
regulation should be.
Where functionalism understands law as a means to achieve
particular social, political or economic ends,B3 this could speak in favor of
governmental

"intervention"

or

against

it,

either

stressing

the

'embeddedness' of individual freedom or underlining the merits of

unfettered private autonomy.B4 The institutional consequences as well as
the normative underpinnings of functionalism are not, at first, so easy
to see. The functionalism that responded to legal formalism's abstract
sovereignty over a deeply divided, violently emerging market society
embraced the idea that generally there was, or could be, a societal
consensus on the desirability of the goals pursued. Given that law was to
navigate in deeply troubled waters, it was also clear that conflicts would
inevitably arise with regard to the concrete strategies and instruments to
pursue those goals.85 Not surprisingly, legal and social theory scholars
spilled considerable amounts of ink over the optimal conceptualization
of an adequate regulatory

approach to a fast-changing society,

characterized by the increasing emergence of conflict zones and
conflicting social interests.86 Scholars of contract law87 began to explore
the constitutionalizing potential of private law to inform models of "private
government," unfailingly recognizing the political nature of private law
regulation.

88

Corporate Law scholars and economists explored the

troubling position of the 'modern corporation' between private and public
law, between investors' private property interests and the larger
societal interests in the sustained economic performance of the
corporation.89 Echoing corporate lawyers' trouble with delineating the
optimal forms of regulating business, administrative law scholars found
themselves between the firing lines of the state and the market in a fastevolving mixed economy of intersecting private and public actors.90 In
the United States as in Western Europe, administrative lawyers were

soon awakening to their highly politicized

role in operating a

constitutional polity through the stormy seas of pre-war, interwar and
post-war economies

and ideological

contestations

of democratic

government.91 Central to all these scholarly endeavors was the role of
scientific progress and the role of experts in finding the best legal
solution.92 A major challenge for legal functionalism, largely unmet, was
the degree to which a government that was activist, responding to crises
and delivering public services, could succeed in promoting democratic
representation in the elaboration and execution of its ambitious policies. 93
Paving

the way for the early twenty-first

century's arrival of

neofunctionalism, the technocratic functionalism of the expanding
twentieth century welfare state had widened, not bridged, the gap
between

the

state

and

its

citizens

in

complex,

differentiated,

multicultural and transnational societies.
[A]s the ideals of the Functional Society came only to be
partly realized in the twentieth-century welfare state, the
functionalist style in public law tended to preserve itself
more as a disposition than as the exposition of an alternative
social philosophy. And once this happened, the more positivistic
aspects of functionalism (power vs. power) gained the upper
hand,

and

the

underlying

idealist

dimensions

were

suppressed.94
Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff, in German constitutional and
administrative law, are the most eloquent representatives for this turn

of functionalism.95

III.

THE

CHALLENGES

OF

Socm-EcoNOMIC

REGULATION

IN

THE

TWENTIETH CENTURY

As the debates over the politics of legal regulation continued,96
later developments, depicted by labels such as globalization, global
economic competition and deterritorialization,

97

dramatically accentuated

the normative assumptions underlying the seemingly neutral ideals of
expert rule and scientific government. AB political governments around the
world sought to address regulatory challenges arising from cross-border
developments, the hitherto pursued public programs of social policy came
to be seen as resting on increasingly shaky ground. As globalization began
to unfold within the fragile architecture of domestic legal and political
systems, the challenges to both the regulatory concepts and instruments of
the social engineers and the political hopes in the self-ordering capacities of
a democratic society became frighteningly clear. As the time horizon,
against which scholars and policy makers would commit their inquiry to
the project of "making basic changes [. . .] necessary if we are to maintain
the productive capability of the market economy while assuring our
capacity to maintain a productive and healthy environment,"98 was rapidly
shrinking, functionalism took on an ever more reactive and responsive
mode of adaptation. The mounting pressures on political governments to
master the socio-economic and legal challenges arising from a fastglobalizing world of increasingly interdependent trade relations were
amplified by deep-running societal concerns with questions of political

participation, representation and redistribution. Thirty years after the end
of World War II, Western industrialized nations found themselves under
immense pressure to translate highflying political agendas into workable
regulatory instruments, which were increasingly met with apathy, alienation
and implementation obstacles.99
The challenges of globalization to domestic state-originating welfare
programs-that had in their growth during the twentieth century
involved

dramatic

increases

in

redistribution,

juridification

and

infrastructure provision-had a very domestic face. In fact, the arising
critique of the welfare state's negative effects on societal self-regulation
operated with little reference to "globalization." AB the next section will
show, the rise of welfare state critique and the emergence of alternative
modes of legal regulation had its origins within the particular regulatory
histories of expanding forms of state intervention. Globalization, in turn,
further accentuated and fueled a transformation of public governance
that was already beginning to unfold from within the cores of western
welfare states.

A

The Emergence of Responsive/Reflexive Law
The disillusionment both with the propagation of "rights" as a

means to address social inequality and with the allegedly "neutral"
principles underlying legal process and adjudication

100

eventually

prepared the grounds for a growing discontent with law as a sound
instrument of social change. 101 In response, scholars on both sides of the

Atlantic began to relativize law's sovereignty. Feeling the weight of
overly zealous and inadequate forms of ''juridification" 102 and facing the
costs of a structurally and normatively exhausted welfare state,103
law's autonomy began to be seen as relative. Scholars saw law as one
among several modes of political regulation, certainly not as the only or
even the most promising one. Some rejoiced, because they had already
long been hostile to the state's continued attempts to regulate economic
relations.

104

Others, however, reacted to the continued expansion of

rationalist, bureaucratic regulation into the 'life-world' with grave
concerns

over

the

viability

of

informal,

culturally

grounded

understandings as the basis for societal self-regulation and cohesion. 105

1. Responsive Law
In a small volume, published in 1978, Philippe Nonet and Philip
Selznick carved out a political theory oflegal regulation, in the center of
which they placed the concept of "responsive law."106 They aptly
characterized the contemporary U.S. society as torn by competing
views on an ideal social order and placed the search for law at the
center of this larger battle: "Whatever the labels, and whatever the
ideological affinities, these perspectives are being tested today as legal
institutions adapt to changing attitudes and expectations, to social
cleavage and disaffection." 107 Building on Weber's depiction of the
rational quality of modern law, Nonet and Selznick recognized the
increasing differentiation of law into specialized areas of social

ordering. As Weber had seen the system of law to be depending in
large part on the emergence of a professional body of legal experts,
Nonet and Selznick identified how expert rule would promote a separation
of law and politics and, increasingly, a "narrow conception of the role of
law."108 As this model of law removed legal regulation and regulators
"from the ambit of political controversy and conflict," 109 "strains,
opportunities, and expectations" continued to arise that would lead to a
conflict-laden re-approximation of law and politics. 110
The paradox of rational government lay in the fact that the more legal
experts asserted the objective nature of their actions, the more these
actions met with critique and resistance. Responsive law, then, would
emerge against the background of a long-standing skepticism towards the
autonomy and rationality of law.111 Front and center to a postautonomous, responsive model of law would be a form of legal
regulation that "perceives social pressures as sources of knowledge and
opportunities for self-correction."112 Responsive law's self-liberation from
formalism, however, moved a now explicitly "purposive law" (dangerously)
close to policy. 113 The resulting difficulties would prove immense:
When accountability is to more general ends, dedication to rules
is no longer enough to shield officials from criticism. But to
generalize responsibilities is to run the risk of diluting them.
General ends tend to be impotent, that is, so abstract and vague
that they offer neither guidance in decision nor clear standards of

evaluation.114
Read

against the promises

of formalism

studied

above, the

functionalist aspirations of responsive law put law and lawyers under
immense pressure. Responding to the insulation of technocratic legal rule
from societal negotiations of values and interests asking the law to "foster
civility" through an "ethic of responsibility," 115 responsive law must
apparently rely on a problematic inner core in order not to be fully
consumed by societal forces. This core is formed in a combination of
process (participation) and substance (civility). At the time of their
writing, Nonet and Selznick proved perfectly attuned to the particular
challenges arising from complex governance modes in a system of
multilayered and interdependent social organizations. Their promotion of
"post-bureaucratic organization" 116 reflected their valuable interdisciplinary
search into the emerging complexities of the knowledge society. 117 Both
the procedural and the substantive sides of the reflexive law recipe to
address regulatory challenges in a divided society, however, prove to be
extremely ambitious, perhaps too ambitious. Towards the end of their
book, the authors don't hold back: "Responsive law presupposes a society
that has the political capacity to face its problems, establish its priorities, and
make the necessary commitments." 118 Here the bias of the program
becomes strikingly apparent. Against the background of the trajectory of
legal development from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the
authors put forward a model of substantive legal regulation that pays a high
price to bridge the gap between law and politics, between government and

society. Recognizing that any reincarnation of top-down regulation,
regardless of the normative justification that is offered, would further
widen the legitimacy gap in times of regulatory complexity and political
apathy, Nonet and Selznick suggest that citizens ought to take law into their
own hands in order to reach consensus as to the direction of social order.
This, however, results in a powerful redirection of law to its formalist
mode, operating in a "heaven of pure legal concepts." 119 How else ought
we to understand the authors' expressed hope that society come together
and identify "its problems," "its priorities," and "its commitments"? The
reason for the growing regulatory challenges to modern law was and
continues to be the rising complexity of society. To address a multiplicity of
values, interests and rationalities with a dedication to democratic
governance ultimately to result in consensus, idealizes the forces of cohesion
in a society that is actually deeply complex and fragmented. Therein lies, to
be sure, the great danger for law, for political, in particular democratic
theory and for any grand-scale social theory. Therein lays, however, at the
same time, great hope to better identify the potential of law to play a distinct
role in the complex array of voices and forces.

2. Reflexive Law
Meanwhile, legal

theoreticians in

Western

Europe

posited a

reconceptualization of regulatory law by emphasizing the necessity of
law's reflexivity, its capacity to respond to the changing conditions of
regulatory implementation 120 and the proceduralization of law.121

Reflexive law promoted the opening of the law to the different, varied and
competing rationalities of a society highly differentiated along functional
lines.122 As the project of reflexive law became formulated in the context
of an exhausted welfare state's regulatory capacities, the nature of law's
involvement in societal processes was still at the heart of a critical
inquiry into the role, function and status of law .123 With reflexive law
emerging out of the eggshells of a fast-decaying welfare state, it was
conceived in light of a long generation of negative and positive civil
rights, of a strong interconnection between deliberation over social policy
on the one hand and of the crossfertilization of administrative and
constitutional law on the other.
To be sure, the rise of reflexive law did not occur without
contestation. Reactions, many of them negative, were swift and farreaching. Nik.las Luhmann observed that, if the concept of reflexive law
implicitly

or

regulation,"124
relativized

the

explicitly
reflexive
concept

defended
law
of

law's

unduly
system

claim

and

to

"comprehensive

somewhat

autonomy

in

a

prematurely
functionally

differentiated society.125 Others felt that positing law as an "autopoietic,"
i.e.,

autonomous,

self-referentially

reproducing,

social

system 126

constituted a betrayal of law's emancipatory political powers as a force of
social transformation. 127 Arguing from the perspective of democratic
theory, 128 the turn of law onto itself as autopoietic law was seen as
bolstering wide-spread privatization and deregulation, which in turn

would diminish the emancipatory forces of law.129 Another critique took
issue with reflexive law's connection to the concept of autopoietic law,
which described law as operationally closed (self-reproducing) and
cognitively open (towards its environment), 130 and markedly pointed out
the specific challenges for political (legal) theory arising from this
description.131
Reflexive law theorists, in response, acknowledged the merits of a
critique of legal formalism and its potential to look beyond the letter of
the law. But, other than the Legal Realists, proponents of reflexive law
sought to reach beyond an understanding of law that would describe
its function in the resolution of conflicts between "right" and "left,"132
or between market regulation and freedom of contract. 133 The theory of
autopoietic law, which lay at the basis of the concept of reflexive law,
posited the self-referential nature of the societal subsystems, including
law. 134 This led to an understanding of society as a social system made
up of subsystems of particularly structured modes of communications.
Each subsystem, then, would form the environment for another system,
leading to a diversified communication of societal (system) rationalities.
135 The reflexive law theorists rejected a bi-polar view regarding redistributive outcomes or progressive versus conservative political agendas.
Instead, they suggested that although the law was placed at a unique
place from which it would constantly receive manifold communications,
influences and pressures from different parts of society, its evolution depended on its ability to maintain this intricate relationship to its

environment. 136 Its self-reproduction depended on its constant exposure
to the forces of society, while reconstructing these signals in its own
language or code. Instead of promoting the idea of an a-political law, the
concept of reflexive law radicalized and expanded the older critique of
legal formalism and made law receptive to the full spectrum of societal
rationalities.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American development became
determined by an intricate and challenging combination of activist
rejections of law as an instrument of the status-quo upholding power on
the one hand and the differentiation of procedural rights on the other. The
work of Charles A. Reich,137 Marc Galanter, 138 David Trubek, 139
Duncan Kennedy, 140 Gerald Frug, 141 and Richard Stewart142 can be
seen as illustrative of this complex combination of societal activism and
conscious embrace of legal regulation. The continued elaboration 143 and
contestation of these approaches 144 eventually prepared the field for
assessments of law and regulatory governance, 145 which address the
serious challenges of identifying the politics in a transnational regulatory
environment, 146 shaped by both public and private law, 147 official and
unofficial, soft and hard norms. 148
As demonstrated, concepts of "responsive" or "reflexive" law had

emerged at the intersection between a turn to or away from law as a
means of social regulation. Both responsive and reflexive law had sought a
way out of the dilemmas which had been identified by both progressive

and conservative critics of regulation and "juridification."149 In light of
the growing awareness that legal regulation would have to deal
simultaneously with an increasingly complex society riddled

with

conflicting interests and identities on the one hand, and with a
dramatically expanding scope of governmental regulation of areas of
society previously seen as remote, self-reliant and "private" on the other,
legal theory had to conceptualize a new model of law adequate to this
challenge. Responsive/reflexive law offered just that. In an ingenious and
very ambitious way, responsive/reflexive legal theorists suggested an
understanding of legal regulation as a process that could not be initiated
from a central, elevated place of sovereignty in terms of power and
knowledge. Instead, law would have to be understood as inherently
caught up in the conflict-ridden processes of a functionally differentiated
society. 150 Despite the difference in degree to which scholars in the
respective camps were willing to accept the sociological description of a
post-bureaucratic society 151 or a functionally differentiated society,152
responsive/reflexive law theorists posited that law would have to be
tentative, experimental, and learning. Such a conception had far-reaching
consequences for a conceptualization and application of law in an
environment that had become increasingly complex since the early days
of the rise of the interventionist state. 153
The striking characteristic of responsive/reflexive law was that it did
not confine itself to the suggestion of subjecting all legal decisionmaking to

sophisticated

processes

of

deliberation

and

negotiation.

The

proceduralization of law 154 did not stop at the formal level, where it
certainly led to a far-reaching reliance on procedure as a means to
strengthen the law's sensitivity to ''voice" over "exit." 155 What would
instead become central to the concept of reflexive law was its intricate
(and contested) connection between formal and substantive aspects
oflegal regulation. 156 While the formal aspects concerned the opening up
of the legal decision-making process to a process of societal deliberations
("voice"), the substantive side of reflexive law could not have been
conceived in a more radical fashion. Giving up any hope to ground a
viable legal judgment on principle based on rational consideration, on
faith, or on specific political views, reflexive law theorists argued that the
responses of law to a specific context would inevitably emerge as a
result of never-ending processes of specialized rationality collisions. 157
In this way, reflexive law took seriously the longstanding contention
of law's perennial indeterminacy,

158

but it went further than that.

While the critique of legal formalism as an ideology and a mask to cover
up political motives

and economic rationalities

159

asserted the

possibility of identifying a specific political concept or regulatory idea,
which could be taken as the basis of a legal decision (the "social" or
"material" challenge to formal law), 160 reflexive law came to reject such
mono-causalities of, say, politics, or the economy, as explaining legal
decision-making. Once it was found impossible to determine the content
of the law without uncovering the values, ideas and interests that had

found their way into a norm, it became clear that the law, being
operationally closed and cognitively open, had to be seen as standing
in a very particular relationship with those social spheres, which are
themselves determined by rationalities other than those that governed
law and legal thinking. It is here that the reflexive law theorists moved
beyond the critique of the indeterminacy of law developed by the legal
realists and critical legal studies and radicalized the idea of law's
indeterminacy to reconstruct law as one rationality among others in
society. As a result, society itself ceased to be conceivable as a unified,
overseeable and identifiable entity against which it is possible to
uncover the ideological basis of law. 161 Such a model of society makes it
impossible for lawyers to identify one single, decisive motive behind a
legal argument. Instead, the task of lawyers would be to recognize the
many ways in which the law is in fact responsive to and refiexive of the
many different societal rationalities, which the law was charged to
"translate" or to "reformulate" into its own language, using the legal
code.

162

Law, in this understanding, is to be conceived as both

distinct-when considering its own rationality and ways of "thinking''
and "speaking''-and simultaneously immersed in society's ongoing process
of differentiation, conflict and experimentation. "A reflexive orientation
does not ask whether there are social problems to which the law must be
responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow
legal regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time,
irreversibly destroying patterns of social life." 163

B. Faces in the Mirror
"One can reject the imperialist claims of the criterion of efficiency
and at the same time use economic k nowledge in order to
understand what happens when the logic of legal structures and
that of economic structures impinge on each other."164

It is important to keep this background in mind, when assessing
contemporary developments. Today's combination of neo-formalism and
neo-functionalism occurs ""after the welfare state" and in denial of it. It
portrays law's primary role as serving society's needs to govern itself and
thereby blinds us to the historically grown embeddedness of private
ordering in a sophisticated legal-pluralist framework. What today's
functionalism suggests is a smooth ride in social selfregulation from
which the law should, for the most part, be excluded or at least be kept at
a distance. It thereby obscures the deeply conflictual and hybrid nature
of legal regulation of which scholars throughout the twentieth century
had always been so conscious. Whereas historically formalism and
functionalism related to each other by way of conceptual and political
contestation, it seems today that both formalism and functionalism have
joined ideologically in that both present law as a politically neutralized
tool of expert management. This turns the earlier, historical turn of
lawyers to science and expertise 165 on its head. The neutralization of
law has consequences: on the one hand, law is expected today to

function in its traditional mode where "true" legal expertise is required,
for example in the protection of property interests through the formal
application of allegedly "clear" legal norms. 166 On the other hand, law
should be reflexive,

meaning

facilitative,

indirectly

intervening,

empowering, where external expertise-mostly of "market," but also of
the "scientific" kind-is believed to be better equipped to facilitate social
ordering. This combination is ideological because both of these fields of
expertise are considered a-political, when in fact in all these references
to "law," the "market," and "experts," the choice takes place within
political, economic and other normative frameworks. Neo-formalism and
neo-functionalism transform formalism and functionalism respectively.
Formalism is no longer seen as aspiring to, or supported by, a
specific or general logical coherence; instead, it becomes a fighting word
against what is now deemed to be legal '"intervention'" into otherwise
more efficient processes of social selfgovernance. Functionalism is no
longer associated with the aspiration to achieve a specific goal and
with the political debate out of which a consensus in support of that
goal eventually arose; instead, all legal intervention is to take place or to
be withheld in accord with, and in response to, the "needs" of a functional
group. It is the particular context, the political climate and capacity to
promote certain views that shapes the communication of such needs.
The current revival of both formalism and functionalism occurs
according to a regulatory agenda and political outlook entirely different
from that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two

developments are of relevance here: one concerns the delay with which
the changed social environment was methodologically assessed by
administrative and, certainly, by constitutional law scholars. 167 The
other one arises from the unresolved status of the political relevance of
the rule of law or, in other words, the role of law in regulation. The
urgency of questioning what lies behind this misalignment is further
manifested by the manner in which progressive agendas are today
again clashing with claims to technical expertise. What we see colliding
are claims of bureaucratic discretion with those of judicial and
democratic review and control as well as claims of individual autonomy
with concerns over paternalistic public governance by the state. 168 The
recurrence

of the same oppositional

patterns, which already

characterized administrative law debates over one-hundred years
ago, 169 prompts the question what the differences might be between the
discussions then and those taking place now. What occupies the space
between the rise of the Providential State of the early twentieth century
170

and the Enabling State of the early twentyfirst? This unanswered

question drives the powerful revival of formalism and functionalism
in current regulatory theory and practice. 171

1. The Turn to Market

"If the future already lay in history's wallet, the social-political
task was to call its impending forms into being."172

Across the divides of disciplinary subfields, a growing number of
scholars are promoting the return to a strictly limited role of the law in
favor of a market-based regime of self-regulation. The neo-formalists and
neo-functionalists confess to a troubling loss of faith in adjudication 173 in
the name of an approach to legal regulation that is allegedly more
responsive to market demands and less prone to the much-contested
attempts at social engineering by judges.

174

The renewed hostility

towards judges is nourished by decades of policydriven, substantivist
judicial interpretation of legal rules. 175 The invocation of formalism now
serves to tame, stifle and silence a judiciary, which is seen as "activist"
and overzealous. 176
The lack of sophistication of this analysis is striking. If it were
really true that there can be an effective rule making and rule
application, but that it should not be placed in the hands of overzealous
judges, we could indeed be prompted to take the anti-judiciary affect
seriously. Instead, the attack on judges becomes an attack on the law
itself, which the neo-formalist reduces to a spiritless, technical body of
rules, allegedly made by men and best placed in the hands of mennot of judges. This move against the judiciary and the law seeks to
obscure the fundamental quality of rules, which are, in the moment that
they are applied through a commonly established institutional set-up,
always already "pieces in a larger compromise of interests" and as such
not amenable to ad-hoc changes, whether in the name of ''justice" or any
other "spirit."177

To be sure, the problem that motivates the critique of adjudication is
not whether it is judges, parliaments or administrative agencies that are
making rules. It is the idea that law is part of a larger normative
framework, the actual

realization of which has been, mostly for

historically contingent reasons, 178 placed within a particular institutional,
complex political, socio-economic framework that is particularly
troubling to the neo-formalists and neo-functionalists. It is for this reason
that appeals to legislative action over judicial activism or, say the work
of expert committees,

179

are mere smoke and mirrors. Even if the

legislator demanded of the judge to act "formally," it would still be the
case that the judge must ask exactly the same question about this rule as
about any other that comes to him (or her) from the legislature. Its
enactment represented a compromise of interests based on some set of
quite possibly conflicting expectations about how its application would
affect the future distribution of satisfactions. 180
This new confidence in a formalist understanding of law is
accompanied by a powerful and highly influential defense of functionalist
approaches to legal regulation. Judges and, for that matter, lawmakers,
should "interfere" with societal processes of self-organization only where
there is a legitimate basis for such intervention, which means that they
should usually abstain. The critique of the role of judges is thus
intimately tied to a radical critique of the state and of law as both an
institution and instrument of social change. Whereas at the height of the
turn-of-the-century

Interventionist

and

emerging

welfare

state

functionalism would encompass the administration's use of law as an
instrument of social change, often pushed forward against the resistance
of a conservatively staffed judiciary, 181 today's neo-functionalism seeks to
domesticate both the state and the judiciary by emphasizing state
institutions' incompetence to properly order society. Instead, the neofunctionalist emphasizes society's quasi-natural powers to self-regulate its
affairs, without undue and ill-fitting intervention by public authorities.

2. Conceptual Paths
Conceptually, form and function have always been two sides of the
same coin. The appeal of formalism to coherence, authority and unity
stands in an ambiguous relation to the aspiration of functionalism to
substantive

goals,

ends-means

correlations

182

and institutional

instrumentalization. But the modesty of one-formalism-is the hubris
of the other-functionalism. The functionalist's submission of legal
instruments to substantive goals had to reckon with the normative
grounds of formal guarantees, rights, and procedures. Recognizing that
the grounds of legal unity and legal instrumentalism are inherently
caught in a paradoxical relation, 183 formalists and functionalists saw
how they were inextricably intertwined so that one approach could never
exist without the other.
Against the background of rich historical and conceptual studies,
comparative legal scholarship has only slowly begun to explore the
parallels, disjunctures and overlaps between public and private

regulatory law here and there. After conflict of laws scholars had already
posited the need to embed their assessments in a deeper comparative
understanding of the existing publidprivate regulatory cultures in
different countries in the 1970s, 184 impulses today are coming from
administrative law scholars on the one hand 185 and constitutionalization
scholars

on

the

other. 186

As

these

inquiries

continue,

one

canunsurprisingly-recognize a distinct renaissance of visions of social
order without formal law elements lying at their base.

187

While not

intended, this "new legal pluralism," as pointed out by its discontents,
188

runs the risk of sailing hard on the winds of neo-liberal, deregulatory

politics. 189
It is against this background that we may gain a deeper,
contextualized, understanding of the present dominance of functionalism
in many fields of law and policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly
after 1989, there has been an ever more widely held view that we are
witnessing a global convergence of modes of thinking about economic
regulation and state governance. The "end of history," so famously
declared by Fukuyama in 1992,190 eventually eclipsed the account by
Michel Albert, that even in light of strong trends of convergence,
differences between capitalist regimes would remain strong. 191 The
pervasive power of the end of history thesis in law has put promoters of
differentiated, historically informed assessments of the role of law as an
instrument of social change on the defensive, while allowing for
ubiquitous references to the law and the "rule of law" to occur in even the

most complex regulatory contexts. 192
3. Deja Vu? The Discursive Return of Reflexive Law
The current operation of formalist/functionalist concepts in legal
regulation builds on regulatory experiences that unfolded in the last few
decades and that are without direct parallels to the first waves of
formalist thinking at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries. It is
an important feature of the current legal regulatory discourse that its
participants are arguing against the background of a complicated and
sobering set of experiences with law. 193 From the impossibility of
preventing outrageous crime 194 to law's exhaustion throughout the
ambitious progressive political attempts to consolidate "rights" as core
assets in a liberal society,

195

law has come to be conceptualized as

playing a highly ambivalent role in a deregulatory, privatized
environment.

196

The long-term consequences of the recent, admittedly

moderate, experimentations with finding a 'third way' between socialism
and capitalism are still matters of speculation. 197 Meanwhile, the law
has become a problematic, at best ambivalent, and often seemingly
unreliable player in the discursive set of contemporary politics. 198 Law's
memory becomes increasingly short-lived, and high stakes of political
contestation, such as the fight over consumer protection rights, 199 are
eventually leveled and comfortably integrated into mainstream legal
discourse. It becomes ever more difficult to trace, let alone to teach, the
reality of conflict over rights even in recent history.200 Because of the
hegemony of economic thinking in law,201 law is caught in polarizing

debates over efficiency vs. planning, private vs. public ordering, selfgovernment vs. command/ control, etc. Still, contemporary discussions
about the merits and limits of privatization should always be taken as
reflections on a longstanding struggle over social emancipation and
contested forms of political government. Contractual governance is in
the

center

of

contemporary

privatization

and post-privatization

discourses.202

IV.

CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACT LAW: THE FALSE PROMISE OF SOCIAL
NORMS

The remainder of this paper is dedicated to a brief discussion of how
formalistlfunctionalist legal thinking has become crucial in a central area of
contemporary regulatory debate. The neo-formalist and neo-functionalist
turn

of

contractual

governance

reveals

how

variations

of

responsive/reflexive law have further accentuated the detachment of
contract regulation from a larger political contestation of the goals of
contractual governance. Yet, the response cannot simply be to aim at a repoliticization of contract law. Against the theoretical background of a
functionally differentiated society, it is more adequate to understand
contract law as a troubled site of intense regulatory experimentation and
innovation. Contract law is a central example of "law after the welfare
state," because it represents a regulatory regime that is constituted and
shaped by an ambiguous relationship between "state" and "society" in
the institutional evolution from the Rule of law to the welfare state. In
the neo-formalist and neo-functionalist reading, however, contractual

governance is offered as a formidable solution to the paradox of
formalist/functionalist law, which it manages in turn to eclipse in its
entirety.

A. Social Norms versus Law?
The present contestation of contract adjudication and the promotion
of social norms as offering a more efficient regulatory framework than
governance by contract law203 is a representation par excellence of private
law "after the welfare state." This invocation of social selfregulation,
which is primarily fuelled by a deep skepticism about the political
regulation of commercial relations, is further accentuated in the context
of an increasingly de-territorialized sphere of economic interaction. 204
To be sure, the reference to the transnational nature of commercial
activity serves as a ground for turning against contract adjudication also
on the domestic level. Another lesson of the twentieth century regulatory
experience with reflexive law is-deliberately-cast aside: in order to fully
understand the dynamics of regulatory politics on a larger scale, we
need to carefully trace the contextual conditions under which we make
legal arguments. In the reductionist form in which 'traditionalists' are
contrasted with "transnationalists"205 it is to be feared that the fight for
recognition of the latter results in the undoing of the emancipation of
the former.

In turn, the maneuvering room for courts adjudicating derailed
contractual arrangements is shrinking as social norms are seen as providing

a comparatively more efficient and cost-reducing regulatory tool.206 The
legal system recedes into the background from where contract parties
merely perceive it as a threat, not as fundamentally structuring the
arrangements to begin with. This approach to social norms breaks not
only with the analysis of the political basis of

both contractual

arrangements and the market,207 it also aims to disentangle contractual
governance from the socio-economic, formal/informal context in which
actors make choices. This marks the social norms theorists' deliberate
departure from work on relational contract and "private govemment"208
that had grown out of the legal realist critique of classical legal contract
theory.209 Earlier work by progressive lawyers had identified the growing
difficulties of situating modem contractual governance in either the public
(law) or private (law) realm, recognizing that both were two sides of the
same coin of contractual governance.210 In contrast, social norms scholars
from law and economics (L&E) seek to redraw the demarcation lines
between the market and the state. Their interest in social norms is not in
the basis of norm-making as part of a larger exploration of sites of social
will-formation, but instead reflects their intention to insulate phenomena
of contemporary

regulatory

governance

from more

comprehensive

assessments of the contexts in which governance modes are emerging.

B. Economics versus Justice

"Apost-ind ustrial society must discover ways to decentralize not

only commodity prod uction, but also significant ways of
lawmaking.'2 11
The recent "discovery" of social norms by L&E scholars212 occurs in
striking insulation not only from a longstanding and intense scholarly
debate,213 but also from a tremendously rich and troubled historical
evolution of regulatory politics in the area of contract law. With little
historical interest in such accounts, the L&E interest in norms is biased
towards a particular, efficiency-oriented understanding of norms and
regulation in present-day contestations of allegedly excessive state
intervention. This approach, however, closes all doors on a more nuanced
understanding of the forever fragile relationship between social norms
and the legal form, one that stood at the centre of landmark work in the
sociology of law.214 It in fact makes a mockery of long-standing insights
into the artificial nature of all legal propositions.215 Instead of perceiving
social norms as "living law" and as a platform for a more comprehensive
exploration of present-day regulatory proposals against the background of
the evolutionary trajectory of welfare and post-welfare state "regulatory
cultures,"216 today's neo-formalists and neo-functionalists' attack on law is
more than a mere plea to recognize the (self-)regulatory capacity of
social norms. It is, rather, the rejection of a critical assessment of how
norms are being translated into law, how legal formation takes place in
the context of highly differentiated and, thus, always contested spheres
of social activity. What really lies behind the plea for social norms over
law is not a genuine interest in norm-formation but a disregard for

processes of negotiation and contestation. This explains the hesitant
reception of legal sociology and the even greater reluctance towards
legal pluralism in the otherwise wholehearted proclamation of the
primacy of norms over law. While sociological and legal pluralist
research on norms has for a long time failed to exert significant
influence on norm-theory, perhaps because of the area's preoccupation
with groups as "operative agents" and L&E scholars' respective focus on
"methodological individualism,"217 there are a few signs for change.218
Clearly, the demand for a fuller appreciation of sociological and legal
pluralist work in the ongoing exploration of the law after the welfare
state is enormous, and one can reasonably expect that the sophistication
of the research in increasingly combining domestic perspectives with
careful studies of emerging transnational regulatory patterns will
eventually influence the present work on norms.
The current introspection is important in the context of this paper
not only because it illustrates the contentious relationship between
formal and informal law, an understanding of which is central to present
studies of contemporary law making developments in different areas of
law.219 The new interest in norms also underlines the precarious status
of legal regulation per se. In an increasingly transnational regulatory
environment,

contractual

governance-traditionally

torn

between

contentions of contract's political nature and private autonomy-unfolds
in a polycontextural sphere which renders any attempt to safely anchor
contract law in this or that social theory, largely futile.220

V.

CONCLUSION

This paper has traced the rising prominence of formalism and
functionalism in diverse areas of "post-welfare state" legal regulation as
un-ironic recurrences of the twentieth century's quest for law. Today,
formalist, functionalist, responsive, reflexive and autopoietic law is
everywhere. Lawyers can snatch up everything and make it their own-a
matter of conversation, the subject of a lawsuit or an essential element
of a social utopia, seen now through a lawyer's eyes. But the real
conceptual contribution of autopoietic law to the previously revisited
historical narrative of formalist/functionalist law is one that is, strikingly,
at

the

center

of

contemporary

assessments

of

institutional

development.221 The concept of autopoietic law helps to carve out the
particularity of the legal operation in distinction to any other form of
societal communication, be it politics, religion, art or economics. Law's
particularity relies on its self-referentiality, its being thrown back onto
its own mode of operation, its self-referential reproduction of its system's
content and form through its code, unique to law and at the basis of any
aspiration to unity and cohesion.222 The radicality of the concept is
becomes apparent when we contrast the historical with the conceptual
sketch. Whereas the former would "find" law to be, at least since
Western modernity, invariably tied up with different emanations of the
state,223 autopoietic law detaches law from its-historically contingentinstitutional affiliation, but understands law in its raw exposure to its

social environment. In that sense, law in fact is everywhere, and it has no
choice. The law's presence in societal conflict is brought into even
sharper relief when we see that its institutional constellation with the
state is only one among endless possibilities of law's exposure to and its
role in society. Autopoietic law, then, radicalizes the particularity of
law's operation by emphasizing its self-referential code-driven quality
on

the one hand while laying bare law's openness, diffusion,

vulnerability and fragility in societal processes on the other.
This gives an entirely new meaning to the formalism/functionalism
narrative that we have seen to be central to law's trajectory in the
twentieth century. Autopoietic law emphasizes how both the positivist and
critical descriptions of formalism underestimate the closure of law's selfreferential

reproduction,

which

only operates through

law-internal

terminology. While the legal positivist pays a high price for law's inner
coherence,224 the critical legal scholar risks losing law as form by
decrying it as camouflage for different emanations of power. In turn,
autopoietic law radicalizes the functionalist's instrumentalization of law as
a means of social engineering by leaving the driver's seat empty.
Rejecting the idea that law, from any single "outside" point, could
determine the outcome of social conflicts, autopoietic law stresses the
way

in which

law

is

a

mere,

yet

highly particular, form of

communication. Building on the concept of a functionally differentiated
society, the law can no longer be seen as performing a particularly
determinative or representative function with regard to economic, political

or other interests but itself can only perform a legal function. Instead of
being removed from society, law is part of it, everywhere exposed to and
in communication with it.
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